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Cumulative prospect theory and deferred
annuities
ABSTRACT
Purpose – Although it has been proved theoretically that annuities can provide optimal
consumption during one’s retirement period, retirees’ reluctance to purchase annuities
is a long-standing puzzle. The purpose of this paper is to use behavioral model to
analyse the low demand for immediate annuities.
Design/methodology/approach – The authors employ Cumulative Prospect Theory
(CPT), which contains both loss aversion and probability transformations, to analyse
the annuity puzzle.
Findings – The authors show that Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) can explain the
unattractiveness of immediate annuities. It also shows that retirees would be willing
to buy a long-term deferred annuity at retirement. By considering each component
from CPT in turn, the loss aversion is found to be the major reason that stops people
from buying an annuity; while the survival rate transformation is an important factor
affecting the decision of when to receive annuity incomes.
Originality/value – This paper identifies CPT as one of the reasons for the low demand
of immediate annuities. It further suggests that long-term deferred annuities could
overcome behavioral obstacles and become popular among retirees.
1 Introduction
During the past few decades, traditional defined benefit (DB) pension plans have been
losing their dominance in private sector pension systems in many countries; there has
been a steady shift from DB pension plans towards defined contribution (DC) pension
plans. Between 1980 and 2013, the number of participants in US private sector DC plans
had increased more than fourfold from 20 million to 92.5 million; while participants in
US private sector DB plans only increased from 38 million to 39 million (US Department
of Labor, 2013). A more extreme shift can be observed in the United Kingdom (UK)
where active membership of DC pension scheme increased from 0.9 million in 2007 to
3.2 million in 2014; while that of DB pension scheme decreased from 2.7 million to 1.6
million during the same period (ONS, 2014). It is widely anticipated that pensioners
will rely heavily on the DC pension plans in the future.
Under DC pension plans, members have access to their accumulated individual
pension account balances rather than receiving a series of regular cheques for life at
retirement. In such a case, the longevity risk, the risk of outliving one’s assets, is
transferred from the corporate sector to DC members. Many scholars support using
immediate annuities as a solution for longevity protection. An immediate annuity pays
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out a periodic income for as long as the annuitant is alive, in exchange for a premium
charge. However, a low volume of premiums of voluntary annuities has been found in
many international markets. Before a significant pension reform in 2011, in the UK,
there used to be two markets: a compulsory one and a voluntary one. According to the
sales figure reported in Cannon and Tonks (2011), the total compulsory annuity premium
income grew to around £11.5 billion in 2010, while the voluntary annuity premium only
amounted to £72 million.
The disparity between the theoretical optimal choice and the consumers’ real prefer-
ences leads to the “annuity puzzle”. Since Yaari (1965) first demonstrated the benefit of
annuitisation in a life cycle model with uncertain lifetime, the subsequent literature on
annuities has provided various reasons to explain the low demand for annuities. Major
reasons include the mortality risk-sharing among family members (Brown and Poterba,
2000), the existence of provision through social security and DB pension scheme mem-
bership (Dushi and Webb, 2004) and the possibility of health care expenditure shocks at
an old age (Davidoff, 2009).
While most conclusions are based on the assumptions that retirees are rational utility
maximisers with risk-averse preferences, some recent studies have moved beyond the
fully rational paradigm and proposed many behavioural factors that could play important
roles in determining how retirees spend their retirement savings. For example, the
decision to annuitise depends on the way in which the available choices are presented
(Framing Effect). It also depends on the level of financial education or the level of
understanding about annuities. In this paper, we seek to explain the unattractiveness of
annuities in the light of behavioural finance and we focus on the impact of Cumulative
Prospect Theory (CPT) which addresses flaws in the expected utility hypothesis and
risk aversion. This theory was initially proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) to
describe how individuals make choices involving risky outcomes. It states that investors
are loss averse rather than risk averse and a certain transformation is performed in
evaluating probabilities. Using descriptive models for CPT, many authors have explained
economic anomalies that cannot be explained by rational models. For example, Benartzi
and Thaler (1995) and Barberis et al. (2001) apply CPT in the explanation of the equity
premium puzzle. Kaluszkaa and Krzeszowiec (2012) use CPT as a method to price
insurance contracts.
Hu and Scott (2007) first adopt CPT in the analysis of annuities. They show that
CPT can explain the low demand for immediate annuities purchased at retirement;
and the probability transformation introduced in CPT makes people prefer deferred
annuities with the first payment delaying for a few years. We build on the work by
Hu and Scott (2007), extend their analysis and make the following contributions: (i)
by conducting the analysis on successive age points in retirement, we conclude that
immediate annuities are not attractive to purchase for retirees at all ages; however,
preferences for deferred annuities increase with the deferred period. (ii) the sensitivity
analysis suggests that the major reason for the unattractiveness of annuities is loss
aversion. The overweighting of low probability events would shift retirees’ preferences
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towards receiving annuity incomes at a later stage. (iii) By conducting an elasticity
analysis we conclude that loss aversion is the most influential factor on the decision
to purchase immediate annuities while the probability transformation determines the
decision to purchase deferred annuities.
This article is organized as follows. In the next section, we provides a detailed
introduction of CPT: the value function and the probability transformation model. Then
in Section 3, we measure the perceived value of an annuity using the CPT framework.
In Section 4, we present the results of relative price difference of annuities. Section 5
presents an extensive sensitivity analysis. Finally, Section 6 concludes the results and
comments on the limitations of the analysis.
2 Introduction to Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT)
CPT is a behavioural model that aims to capture decision making under risk and un-
certainty. It states that the overall value of a risky investment is determined by three
components: a reference point, a value function and a set of decision weights.
Being different from the utility function in expected utility theory, the value function
(v(·)) in CPT has three new properties. Firstly, the value function is based on the distance
(y) between the investment outcome and a reference point, rather than the terminal
investment outcome in the utility function. In a risky investment, the initial outlay
to enter the investment is often regarded as the reference point. Investors would not
simply consider the investment outcome as the gain; instead, they will deduct the initial
outlay from the investment outcome and their satisfaction gained from the investment is
based on this. Secondly, while the utility function describes simply a concave picture,
the value function is concave above the reference point (v′′(y)< 0,y> 0) and convex
below the reference point (v′′(y)> 0,y< 0). This can be illustrated by an example: the
satisfaction increase between a win of £100 and a win of £200 appears to be greater
than the satisfaction increase between a win of £1100 and a win of £1200. Similarly,
the increment in sadness that people feel between a loss of £100 and a loss of £200
tends to be greater than the increment in sadness between a loss of £1100 and a loss of
£1200, unless the large loss would compel people to lower current living standard such
as moving to a less desirable neighborhood. In other words, the value function yields the
property of diminishing sensitivity: the marginal value of both gains and losses generally
diminish with the distance from the reference point. Furthermore, the value function
captures an important characteristic of attitudes to changes in wealth: loss looms larger
than gains. Thus, most people are loss averse and the satisfaction gained from a £100
win cannot erase the sadness brought by a £100 loss. From an experiment conducted by
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), people feel it unattractive to enter the symmetric bet
of winning y or losing y with equal probability, which justifies the assumption that the
value function for losses is steeper than that for gains (v′(y)< v′(−y) fory≥ 0).
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) offer an explicit form for the value function as
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v(y) =
{
yα if y≥ 0
−λ (−y)β if y< 0 (1)
Here, λ reflects the level of loss aversion and α and β reflect diminishing sensitivity.
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) estimate that λ = 2.25 and α = β = 0.88.
Whereas expected utility theory weights the utility at different states with the objec-
tive true probability of each state, experiments conducted by Tversky and Kahneman
(1992) show that for both positive and negative prospects, decision makers always
overweight low probability events and underweight high probability events. Therefore
CPT introduces a method to transform true probabilities to decision weights which
reflect perceived possibilities.
CPT introduces a capacity function w to express decision makers’ opinions of
perceived likelihood of uncertain events. The capacity function w is a non-linear
transformation of the real probabilities p. Two natural boundaries are certainty (w(1) =
1) and impossibility (w(0) = 0). The principle of diminishing sensitivity applies to the
capacity function as well; it means that the influence of a given change in probability
diminishes with its deviation from the boundary. For instance, the change in probability
of winning a prize from 0.9 to 1 has more impact than the change in probability of
winning a prize from 0.6 to 0.7. Similarly, an increase of 0.1 in probability of winning
a prize has more impact when the probability changes from 0 to 0.1 than when the
probability changes from 0.3 to 0.4. Therefore, the capacity function w is concave
near 0 and convex near 1. In addition, the capacity function for positive and negative
investment outcomes should be different because risk-seeking for small probability of
gains is more pronounced than being risk-averse for small probability of losses. The
capacity function is thus assumed to have the following form:
w+(p) =
pγ
[pγ +(1− p)γ ] 1γ
;
w−(p) =
pδ
[pδ +(1− p)δ ] 1δ
.
(2)
Figure 1 here
Based on experimental results in Tversky and Kahneman (1992), γ is estimated to
be 0.61 and δ to be 0.69. Figure 1 exhibits the shape of the capacity function. The
inverted S-shaped capacity function shows that people tend to overweight the probability
of events that are less likely to happen and underweight the probability of events that are
highly likely to happen. Furthermore, we can see that the weighting function for gains
and losses are quite close, although the former is slightly more curved than the latter.
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It reflects the point that risk aversion for gains is more pronounced for risk seeking
for losses, for moderate and high probability events. Additionally, decision makers’
perceptions about probabilities coincide with the true probabilities around 0.35.
Let us define pt as the probability of having an outcome yt . We introduce the
following quantities:
pi−1 = w
−(p1),
pi−t = w
−(p1+ . . .+ pt)−w−(p1+ . . .+ pt−1), 2≤ t ≤ k,
pi+t = w
+(pt+ . . .+ pT )−w+(pt+1+ . . .+ pT ), k+1≤ t ≤ T −1,
pi+T = w
+(pT ).
(3)
where the risky outcomes have been ranked as:
y1 < y2 < .. . < yk < 0≤ yk+1 < .. . < yT .
The ultimate decision weight associated with an outcome is defined as the marginal
value of the respective event. The decision weight pi+t , which corresponds to positive
investment outcomes, is the change in the value of w between two events: “the outcome
is at least as good as yt” and “the outcome is strictly better than yt”. The decision weight
pi−t , which corresponds to negative investment outcomes, is the change in the value of w
between the events: “the outcome is at least as bad as yt” and “the outcome is strictly
worse than yt”.
The value functions and the cumulative decision weights are combined to arrive at
the overall value of a risky investment under CPT:
V ( f−) =
k
∑
t=1
pi−t v(yt),
V ( f+) =
T
∑
t=k+1
pi+t v(yt),
V ( f ) =V ( f−)+V ( f+).
(4)
Letting pit = pi+t if t ≥ k+1 and pit = pi−t if t ≤ k, equation (4) can be reduced to:
V ( f ) =
T
∑
t=1
pitv(yt). (5)
3 Annuity valuations under CPT
The annuity is initially designed as an insurance product that helps reduce longevity
risk. However, people tend to view it as a risky investment product. One reason
might be the lack of understanding of the operational details of annuity products. In a
survey conducted by the American Council of Life Insurance task force, the findings
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of consumers’ attitudes towards annuities showed that virtually no consumer fully
understands how an annuity product works; the least understood aspect of annuities is
how risk sharing is performed so that insurers can offer a lifelong guaranteed income
(Brown and Warshawsky, 2001). Because of this, consumers are more likely to focus on
the risk of dying early, while overlooking the possibility that they may live well beyond
their life expectancies and receive more than they have paid. They may also believe that
the odds in the gamble tend to favor insurance companies. In another similar survey, the
Society of Actuaries (2004) found that 49% of workers and 44% of retirees considered
protecting against loss of value from a pension or annuity investment should they die
earlier than expected as very important. Therefore, within this mental accounting
framework, retirees tend to equate the lifetime annuity purchase with entering a gamble
on their lives. CPT can be applied here to determine the overall value of annuities.
Viewing an annuity investment as a gamble, investors gain if total discounted annuity
incomes exceed the annuity price; whereas investors lose if total discounted annuity
income is below the annuity price. In other words, an annuitant gains if he outlives the
life expectancy assumed in annuity pricing and loses if he dies before he collects as much
income as he paid out. We assume that a retiree aged 65 purchases an immediate annuity
at an actuarially fair price A, then the annuity investment outcome if the annuitant dies
after t years (at age 65+ t) should be:
yt =−A+
t
∑
i=1
Ψ
1
(1+ r)i−1
(6)
where Ψ represents the annual annuity income that is paid in advance and is assumed to
be 1 unit in our study; r represents the assumed constant interest rate; A is the actuarially
fair price of an annuity that pays 1 unit per year in advance until the annuitant dies. No
administrative fees or profit loadings are considered here.
The probability, pt , that corresponds to each annuity outcome yt , is the probability
that the 65-year-old retiree dies in exactly t years, at age 65+ t. With the input yt , we can
get the perceived value of the annuity investment according to equation (1). Furthermore,
we can transform probabilities p to decision weights pi based on equations (2) and (3).
The overall value of the annuity can be calculated according to equation (5).
To reveal the impact of CPT probability transformations on mortality rates, Figure
2 shows the distorted probability pi versus the original probability p when retirees
are at age 65, 75, 85 and 95. The results displayed are based on assumptions of an
annual annuity payment of 1, an interest rate of 3% and an actuarially fair annuity
price. It reflects that the ultimate decision weights will enhance the low probability of
dying shortly after annuity purchase and the low probability of surviving a very long
period after the annuity purchase. At the same time, it will decrease the probability
corresponding to intermediate outcomes.
Figure 2 here
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Figure 3 here
The transformation of the real probabilities will change people’s perceptions of their
life expectancies. Figure 3 describes the differences between subjective complete life
expectancies and real complete life expectancies for male individuals aged between 65
and 95. According to the figure, the distorted probability of dying at each age leads to
the underestimation of life expectancies for young retirees and the overestimation of life
expectancies for old retirees.
Following Hu and Scott (2007), we use the maximum acceptable price as a bench-
mark measure to determine if an actuarially fairly priced annuity is desirable. The
maximum acceptable price, also called the “reservation price”, is the highest price that a
buyer is willing to pay for goods or a service. In the context of an annuity purchase, it
is the price that would make an individual indifferent between purchasing an annuity
and keeping the money in hand. According to equations (1) to (6), the overall value of
an annuity can be regarded as a function of annuity price. The maximum acceptable
annuity price is therefore the price that makes CPT value of an annuity equal to zero.
To facilitate our analysis, we calculate the ratio R, which is the relative difference
between reservation price and fair price.
R=
Reservation Price−Actuarially f air price
Actuarially f air price
A positive R means people would like to pay a higher-than-market price for an annuity
and thus the annuity is attractive. On the other hand, a negative R indicates unattractive-
ness. The modeling results in terms of R can also be interpreted as how much more or
less than market price one would be prepared to pay for an annuity.
4 Results
Due to the fact that no closed form solution for R exists, we solve it numerically. In our
analysis, we consider cumulative prospect theory with probability distortion (using pi)
and without probability distortion (using p). For each one, we consider the situation
with loss aversion (λ > 1) and without loss aversion (λ = 1). Thus we can find out
how CPT influences people’s annuitisation decisions. In the following basic results, we
have assumed that each parameter value in the CPT model is based on the values in
Tversky and Kahneman (1992). That means λ = 2.25 and α = β = 0.88 for the value
function and γ = 0.61 and δ = 0.69 for the probability distortion function. In terms of
the annuity types, we are interested in both the immediate annuities that are purchased
from age 65 to age 95 and the deferred annuities with deferred period from one year to
thirty years (all purchased at age 65). We assume a constant interest rate of 3 percent.
The mortality rates are calculated from the recent standard mortality table “S2PML1”,
1Source: Continuous Mortality Investigation (2013)
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which contains the mortality experience of male pensioners of self-administered UK
pension schemes for the period 2004 to 2011.
Figure 4 here
Figure 5 here
Figures 4 and 5 respectively show the trends in the R values for immediate and
deferred annuities under different versions of the CPT models. In the simplest model
of linear value function with no loss aversion and no probability transformation, R
remains 0 for both types of annuity. It reflects the fact that a risk-neutral individual who
adopts a linear value function should be indifferent between purchasing an actuarially
fairly priced annuity and keeping the money at hand. With the full CPT framework
(CPT including probability distortion and with loss aversion), we notice that immediate
annuities are generally not attractive for retirees between age 65 and age 95. Hence, CPT
can be used as a behavioral explanation for people’s not buying immediate annuities. In
addition, for a 65-year-old retiree, his/her preference for a deferred annuity is always
increasing with the deferred period. In the following, we will analyse each component
in the CPT framework.
Comparing the values of R for CPT models with loss aversion to those without loss
aversion, we notice that in both the immediate annuity case of Figure 4 and the deferred
annuity case of Figure 5, R shifts downwards significantly once the loss aversion factor
is incorporated. This shifts the results in terms of the relative price difference from
positive to negative for both immediate annuities and deferred annuities. Therefore,
immediate annuities are not attractive for loss-averse individuals who are afraid of
dying before reaching average life expectancies and deferred annuities are not attractive
for loss-averse individuals who worry about dying within the deferred period. Hence,
loss aversion is able to explain the low attractiveness of annuity products. Additionally,
comparing the results for the CPT value function with loss aversion in Figure 4 with those
in Figure 5, the magnitude of the change in R is much smaller for immediate annuities
than for deferred annuities. It indicates the behavioural obstacle of loss aversion has
greater impact on the choice of deferred annuities than immediate annuities. One may
notice that the conclusion relies heavily on the assumed value for the loss aversion factor
(which is 2.25); in the next section, we will discuss the stability of the results under a
range of values of loss aversion.
In Figure 4 and Figure 5, we see the impact of probability distortion on immediate
annuities and deferred annuities respectively by comparing the values of R for the
“CPT value function (no loss aversion)” with those for the “CPT including probability
distortion (no loss aversion)”. The probability distortion does not lead to the vertical
shift of the Relative Price Difference (R); instead it creates a twist in the shape of R in
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relation to the age of purchasing (x) or the deferred period (d). The probability distortion
makes immediate annuities become more preferable for older retirees than younger
retirees as R is increasing smoothly with the age of purchase. Given the fact that more
elderly retirees have a smaller possibility of surviving, they overestimate the survival
rate to a greater degree and would be prepared to pay a higher price for immediate
annuity products. The same reasoning applies for deferred annuities. Retirees who
follow CPT overestimate the low probability event of surviving for a long period to a
greater degree and therefore a longer deferred period is much more preferred. Overall,
overweighting of low probability events suggests that people buy annuities that provide
income at an older age, or suggests that there should be a gap between the purchase date
and the payment date.
Among all types of annuities discussed, a 30-year deferred annuity is predicted to
be the most attractive. Since the chance of surviving from age 65 to age 95 is very
low at 0.068 (based on S2PML), the 30-year deferred annuities may be perceived as a
similar product to a lottery ticket. Cumulative Prospect Theory has been used to explain
why individuals love buying classical lottery tickets which have negative expected
outcome(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
5 Sensitivity analysis
In the above calculations, we have assumed that each parameter value is based on the
values in Tversky and Kahneman (1992). Although the results may have biases because
the annuity investment decision typically involves a much larger amount of money
than the gambles used in Tversky and Kahneman’s psychological experiments, they
still provide a good qualitative explanation for the attractiveness of different types of
annuities. In this section, we conduct several sensitivity analyses to find out the relative
attractiveness of annuities with regard to each parameter. The parameters we examine
are: loss aversion, λ , interest rate, r, the curvature of the capacity function, δ and γ , and
the probability of dying at exact age, p (by changing mortality tables).
5.1 Loss aversion sensitivity
The purpose of this sensitivity test is to discover whether retirees with different levels of
loss aversion would like to annuitise their DC account balances. We increase the degree
of loss aversion gradually from λ = 1 (no loss aversion) to λ = 5. Figure 6 displays the
shape of R under the CPT framework with regard to different annuity types and different
levels of loss aversion.
Figure 6 here
In both panels of Figure 6, the attractiveness indicator, R, shifts downwards signifi-
cantly when the level of loss aversion increases; this confirms that loss aversion is an
important driving factor that stops retirees from buying an annuity. As people become
9
more loss averse, the losses arise from an annuity investment in the first few years will
be perceived to be greater than the real values; then individuals would like to pay a lower
price to enter an annuity contract. Additionally, comparing the two panels shows that
immediate annuities are less attractive than deferred annuities. Immediate annuities can
be attractive only when investors are not loss averse; on the contrary, a 30-year deferred
annuity remains attractive even when investors’ loss aversion level increases to 2.25. As
explained above, the popularity of the 30-year deferred annuities could be due to the
“lottery ticket effect”. Thirdly, the sensitivity of R to the loss aversion degree is greater
for deferred annuities than for immediate annuities. It is mainly because, for a deferred
annuity purchaser, the annuity investment does not deliver any income until after the
deferred period. When compared with investing in an immediate annuity, a deferred
annuity investor needs to wait longer for the overall investment outcome to become
positive.
Many empirical studies have confirmed the importance of loss aversion and estimated
the degree of loss aversion. According to Benartzi and Thaler (1995), when making a
material economic decision, such as investing, it is appropriate to assume a loss aversion
of 2. In the annuity decision analysis, we find that the 30-year deferred annuity is
attractive if retirees’ loss aversion level is around 2.
5.2 Interest rate sensitivity
The interest rate is one of the most important factors to determine the price of an annuity
and thus it may affect investment decisions. When the interest rate increases, both the
annuity fair price and reservation price move downwards; it is therefore difficult to
directly judge its influence on the overall attractiveness of annuities. In this section, we
conduct an interest rate sensitivity analysis in order to explore whether retirees would be
willing to convert their DC account balances into annuities when they are exposed to a
range of interest rates from as low as 0.5 percent to as high as 8 percent.
Figure 7 here
Figure 7 shows the trend of R for the CPT framework for immediate annuities and
deferred annuities; we have the following findings. Firstly, the low vertical spreads in R
results demonstrate that the influence of interest rates on annuity attractiveness is small.
We expect this result since our benchmark of attractiveness is determined by relative
price differences in reservation price and fair price. Secondly, with regard to immediate
annuities, individuals are more prepared to make a purchase at retirement when the
interest rate is very high, so that they can lock in the current high returns. As the interest
rate falls, the immediate annuities become more expensive and it is better to delay the
purchase. Similarly for deferred annuities, they are relatively cheap and attractive when
the interest rate is very high; as the interest rate falls, deferred annuities with longer
deferred periods become more preferable.
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Regardless of how we change the interest rate, only the 30-year deferred annuity
remains attractive among all annuity types. A major reason, as we have explained, is
that deferred annuities with very long deferred periods are highly likely to be regarded
as lottery tickets by retirees and thus may be attractive. Given the current low interest
rate environment, immediate annuities are not an attractive purchase while the long term
deferred annuities are predicted to be attractive.
5.3 Probability distortion sensitivity
In this section, we intend to discover the sensitivity of an annuity’s attractiveness to
different levels of probability distortion. Both parameters in the capacity function (see
Equation (2)), δ and γ , which describe decision makers’ opinions of perceived likelihood
of uncertain events, are increased in steps of 0.1 from 0.4 to 1. Figure 8 shows the
capacity function of the real probabilities and we can see that, when γ and δ are kept
low, there is a high degree of twist in the probability values and thus one would assign
higher weights to extreme outcomes and lower weights to intermediate outcomes. When
both γ and δ are 1, there is no probability distortion.
Figure 8 here
Figure 9 here
Figure 9 illustrates how the attractiveness of immediate annuities and deferred
annuities is affected by weaker or stronger probability distortions. It clearly confirms
our previous conclusion that a heavier distortion in probabilities would lead to choices
of annuities that start paying at an older age. For immediate annuitants, it means buying
an annuity at an older age; for deferred annuitants, it means buying one with a longer
deferred period. On the other hand, if decision makers do not show any biases in
probability estimation, the best annuity solution is an immediate annuity at age 65.
Many studies have examined the probability transformation and provided evidence
on the level of distortion which we should apply to large gambles. In the experiments
conducted by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), they allowed subjects to enter gambles
with final payoffs as high as twice the median monthly family income and they estimated
the γ to be 0.61 and δ to be 0.69. Furthermore, Dodonova and Khoroshilov (2006)
provide evidence showing that smaller gambles normally have weaker probability
distortion. Therefore, both sets of empirical evidence suggest a greater probability
distortion when we evaluate annuity decisions which involve large investments. When γ
and δ are around 0.4, annuities that are deferred for more than 20 years are attractive for
investors.
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5.4 Mortality rates sensitivity
By changing the mortality assumptions, we can compare the attractiveness of annuities
among different groups of people. In this section, we consider six different mortality
groups2. Our baseline results are based on S2PML, the mortality experience of male
pensioners of UK self-administered pension schemes for the period 2004 to 2011. S2PFL
is the mortality experience of female pensioners for the same period. SPML03 captures
the male pensioners’ mortality experience for a different period of time: 2000-2006.
Additionally, to discover whether one’s pension amount would affect the decision to
annuitise, the whole population dataset is divided into three subsets: S2PMA-L, S2PMA-
M and S2PMA-H. S2PMA investigates the male pensioners’ mortality experience during
2004 and 2011 by considering the amount of pension. “Light” in S2PMA-L means
that the benefit amount exceeds a specified amount and hence retirees in this group
have relatively light mortality rates; “Heavy” in S2PMA-H means the benefit amount is
lower than a specified amount and retirees in this group have relatively high mortality
rates; “Medium” in S2PMA-M describes the mortality rate when the pension amount is
intermediate.
Figure 10 here
Figure 10 shows the differences in mortality rates qx3, the probability of death at
age x, among the six groups of people that make up the populations for these standard
life tables. The improvement in mortality rates over time can be identified since male
pensioners during an earlier period 2000-2006 have the highest mortality rates. In
contrast, pensioners with a high pension size and female pensioners, during the period
2004-2011, have the lowest mortality rates among the six groups. As a result, pensioners
in SPML03 have the shortest remaining lifetime, while those in S2PFL and S2PMA-L
are expected to live longer than other pensioners of the same age.
Figure 11 here
Figure 11 demonstrates the shape of R under these different mortality assumptions.
In the figure for immediate annuities, the shape of R in relation to the age of purchase
shows that individuals with better health conditions prefer buying an immediate annuity
earlier in retirement while those with worse health conditions tend to delay the purchase.
This is reflected by comparing S2PFL vs. S2PML and S2PML vs. SPML03. Moreover,
comparing R values under S2PMA-L, S2PMA-M and S2PMA-H demonstrates that
retirees with high pension benefits are more likely to purchase immediate annuities early
in retirement.
2The source for the mortality table SPML03 is the Continuous Mortality Investigation (2008); all other
mortality tables come from Continuous Mortality Investigation (2013)
3For clarity, we plot the logarithm of mortality rates.
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In terms of the deferred annuity, all groups find the 30-year deferred annuity the
most attractive to buy among all of the deferred annuity products considered. Moreover,
it is worth noticing that the 30-year deferred annuity is more popular among pensioners
with higher mortality rates. This is because, for pensioners who have a lower possibility
of surviving to age 95, a greater level of probability distortion is involved in the mental
accounting process and the 30-year deferred annuity becomes more valuable to them.
As a result, male pensioners during the period 2000-2006 would be the most interested
in long-term deferred annuities while female pensioners and high-income pensioners
show the least interest.
5.5 A comparison of parameter sensitivity
In order to measure the responsiveness of the Relative Price Difference to the change
in each parameter, we calculate the elasticity of the Relative Price Difference, ER. It
addresses the percentage change in the Relative Price Difference for a given percentage
change in the parameter value and the formula is as follows:
ER =
Percentage change in R
Percentage change in parameter value
=
4R
Raverage
4parameter
parameteraverage
(7)
In Equation (7), 4R stands for the absolute change in R and 4parameter stands
for the absolute change in the considered parameter values. Raverage stands for the
absolute value of average of R under different parameter values and parameteraverage is
the absolute value of the average of chosen parameter values. As the average value is
used to calculate the percentage change, the elasticity of the Relative Price Difference
can be regarded as a point mid-way among all of the R results. After we calculate ER
for all ages of immediate annuity purchases and for all deferred periods of deferred
annuities, we average the results and obtain the elasticity of the Relative Price Difference
for immediate annuities and for deferred annuities respectively. The results are presented
in Table 1. Please note that we use life expectancy at the age of annuity purchase as an
index for each mortality table.
Table 1 here
If ER is greater than 1, the Relative Price Difference changes proportionately more
than the parameter value changes. If ER is less than 1, the Relative Price Difference
changes proportionately less than the parameter value changes, implying a less sensitive
parameter. Based on the results in Table 1, the following conclusions can be drawn.
First, loss aversion is a very sensitive factor for both immediate and deferred annuities.
It confirms our finding in the previous sections that loss aversion could be the major
reason for the low valuation of annuity products. Second, an interesting finding is that
probability distortions, reflected in γ and σ , have a great impact on the attractiveness of
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deferred annuities, but a small impact on that of immediate annuities. It indicates that
people who have different levels of mortality rates transformation would have similar
preferences for immediate annuities but distinct preferences for deferred annuities.
Similarly, the deferred annuity have greater sensitivity to mortality parameters than
immediate annuities, which is as we would expect. Finally, the elasticity of the Relative
Price Difference for deferred annuities is in general much higher than that for immediate
annuities, which justifies our previous conclusion that CPT has a greater impact on
deferred annuities than immediate annuities.
6 Conclusions
Classical expected utility maximization theory suggests that annuities provide optimal
consumption during a retiree’s retirement period, and hence it does not explain why the
majority of retirees do not voluntarily convert their DC pension account balances into
annuities. In this paper, we move beyond the rational paradigm that is assumed by the
expected utility theory, in an attempt to discover if behavioral factors may be able to
explain the way that people spend their retirement funds. We have applied cumulative
prospect theory (CPT) to calculate the overall perceived value of annuities, from which
we obtain the maximum price that individuals would like to pay for an annuity. By
comparing this with the annuity price, we are able to conclude whether annuities in the
market are attractive. We have also conducted several sensitivity analyses to study the
relative attractiveness of annuities with regard to each parameter in the CPT model.
Our work is an extension of the paper by Hu and Scott (2007), who show that CPT
is one of the behavioural factors that prevent people from buying an annuity. After
confirming their conclusions, we have the following additional findings under CPT
assumptions. First, immediate annuities are in general not attractive for retirees aged
from 65 to 95; deferred annuities with a longer deferred period are more preferable.
Second, loss aversion is the major reason for not purchasing annuities; and distortions
in probability shift preferences towards an annuity that starts paying at an older age.
Third, loss aversion is the most influential factor for the purchase decision of immediate
annuities; and the mortality rate transformation determines the decision to purchase
deferred annuities.
Based on our findings, some recommendations can be drawn for life insurance
companies to improve the demand for annuities. One recommendation is the launch of
long-term deferred annuities, which seem to have many competitive advantages. Firstly,
making an early purchase decision would give a lower price. Taking a 30-year deferred
annuity as an example, the price is only 0.64% of a comparable immediate annuity
purchased at age 65. Secondly, with the lower price, it actually provides a similar level
of longevity protection as an immediate annuity since longevity risk is concentrated in
the tail. Moreover, CPT suggests individuals tend to overestimate the small probability
of surviving for a long period. The popularity of lottery tickets may indicate the possible
popularity of long-term deferred annuities. In recent years, deferred annuities have
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aroused intensive discussion in the literature as a retirement solution (Milevsky, 2005;
Scott et al., 2011).
Another recommendation is to introduce some additional product features in existing
products to attract loss averse customers. Our research indicates that, the major reason
for low demand is that individuals are afraid of making a loss from an annuity investment.
It can be improved by providing a guaranteed period of payments that does not depend
on the survival of annuitants, which is already a common feature in the annuity markets.
In terms of deferred annuities, this could be a return of a certain percentage of premiums
if annuitants die within a certain number of years. Of course, these additional features
would make annuities more expensive; however, they also reduce the possible high
losses and could make it more attractive for loss averse customers.
While we predict customer behaviors and recommend the design of possibly more
attractive annuity products, our study has one limitation. The values of parameters
in the CPT model are based on the work in Tversky and Kahneman (1992). Their
experimental design involves gambles rather than annuity purchases. Therefore the
results presented here are not precise quantitative predictions, but can only provide
qualitative explanations of the relative attractiveness of various types of annuities.
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Figure 1. CPT capacity function w(p)
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Table 1. Elasticity of the Relative Price Difference (ER)
Immediate annuities
Parameters λ r γ & δ e˚
ER 1.5434 0.0252 0.7158 0.2694
Deferred annuities
Parameters λ r γ & δ e˚
ER 5.3152 0.1784 7.0907 6.1250
Notes: λ measures the level of loss aversion, r represents the interest rate, δ and γ determines
the curvature of the capacity function, e˚ represents the life expectancy corresponding to each
mortality table.
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Figure 2. Probability of dying at different ages
(a) for a 65-year-old retiree
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(b) for a 75-year-old retiree
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(c) for a 85-year-old retiree
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(d) for a 95-year-old retiree
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Figure 3. Complete life expectancies under the impact of CPT probability
transformations
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Figure 4. The Relative Price Difference (R) under CPT for immediate annuities
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Figure 5. The Relative Price Difference (R) under CPT for deferred annuities
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Figure 6. The sensitivity of the loss aversion factor on the Relative Price Difference
(R) of annuities
(a) immediate annuities
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(b) deferred annuities
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Figure 7. The sensitivity of the interest rate on the Relative Price Difference (R) of
annuities
(a) immediate annuities
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(b) deferred annuities
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Figure 8. CPT capacity function w(p) under different levels of probability distortion
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Figure 9. The sensitivity of the probability distortions on the Relative Price Difference
(R) of annuities
(a) immediate annuities
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(b) deferred annuities
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Figure 10. A comparison of Mortality rates
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Notes: S2PML is the mortality experience of male pensioners of UK self-administered pension
schemes for the period 2004 to 2011. S2PFL is the mortality experience of female pensioners
for the period 2004 to 2011. SPML03 is the male pensioners’ mortality experience between
2000 and 2006. S2PMA-L, S2PMA-M and S2PMA-H represent male pensioners’ mortality
experience during 2004 and 2011 by considering the size of pension savings: Light (L), Medium
(M) and Heavy (H).
Source: The source for the mortality table SPML03 is the Continuous Mortality Investigation
(2008); all other mortality tables come from Continuous Mortality Investigation (2013).
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Figure 11. The sensitivity of the mortality rates on the Relative Price Difference (R) of
annuities
(a) immediate annuities
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(b) deferred annuities
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Notes: S2PML is the mortality experience of male pensioners of UK self-administered pension
schemes for the period 2004 to 2011. S2PFL is the mortality experience of female pensioners
for the period 2004 to 2011. SPML03 is the male pensioners’ mortality experience between
2000 and 2006. S2PMA-L, S2PMA-M and S2PMA-H represent male pensioners’ mortality
experience during 2004 and 2011 by considering the amount of pension: Light (L), Medium (M)
and Heavy (H).
Source: The source for the mortality table SPML03 is the Continuous Mortality Investigation
(2008); all other mortality tables come from Continuous Mortality Investigation (2013).
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